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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1764 
___________ 
 
YAKOV G. DRABOVSKIY, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN OF THE FCI ALLENWOOD 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-13-cv-00383) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 25, 2013 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: August 6, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Yakov G. 
Drabovskiy was convicted, after a jury trial, of twenty counts of violating 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1253(a)(1)(B) for failing to depart after having been ordered removed.  United States v. 
Drabovskiy, W.D. La. Crim. No. 2:09-cr-00146.  On April 6, 2010, he was sentenced to 
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seventy-eight months in prison (with credit for time served since his arrest) and a term of 
supervised release.  Drabovskiy appealed the judgment to the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.   
 While the appeal was pending, Drabovskiy, housed at the Federal Correctional 
Institution at Allenwood, filed two habeas corpus petitions in the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (M.D. Pa. Civ. Nos. 4:10-cv-01830 & 4:10-
cv-02226).  In the first, he challenged his conviction for failure to depart and explained 
that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was “designed for QUICK liberation.”  The District Court 
construed the petition as filed under § 2241 and denied it without prejudice because 
Drabovskiy had not exhausted his direct appeal and presented claims not appropriately 
brought pursuant to § 2241 (the challenge, the District Court explained, should have been 
initiated in the district of conviction as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255).  The District 
Court also ruled that the challenge was premature insomuch as it challenged immigration 
custody because Drabovskiy was not in immigration custody.   
In the second petition, Drabovskiy again challenged his conviction.  The District 
Court ruled that the petition was a successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) and that 
the claims were still unexhausted (because the direct appeal then remained pending), still 
misdirected (because they should have been brought in a § 2255 motion in the district of 
conviction), and still premature as to any immigration custody issues.   
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Drabvoskiy’s 
criminal case in June 2011.  See United States v. Drabovskiy, 435 F. App’x 319 (5th Cir. 
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2011) (per curiam).  It does not appear that Drabovskiy sought relief under § 2255 in the 
District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.  Instead, in February 2013, 
Drabovskiy filed, in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, another 
challenge to his conviction for failure to depart.  He also argued that the writ of habeas 
corpus must not be suspended.
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A Magistrate Judge recommended that Drabovskiy’s case be dismissed.  The 
Magistrate Judge described his filing as an unauthorized successive petition under 
§ 2244(a) and a petition that was not properly brought under § 2241 because it needed to 
be presented as a § 2255 motion in the district of conviction.  The Magistrate Judge 
further stated that to the extent that Drabovskiy sought to challenge any immigration 
detention, any challenge to future immigration detention was premature where he was not 
yet in the custody of immigration officials and any challenge to past detention was moot 
where he had already been released from it.  After Drabovskiy filed objections in which 
he stated, among other things, that he “does not challenge this immigrational [sic] 
problems in [his] petition,” the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and 
recommendation with a modification to not consider the immigration-custody issues.  
The District Court dismissed the action without prejudice to Drabovskiy’s pursuit of the 
other legal avenues described in the report.  Drabovskiy then filed a motion to amend his 
                                            
1
 In doing so, he contended that a suspension-of-the-writ claim “should not be confused 
with 2241, 2254, or 2255 petitions.”  
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filing to add a claim about the indictment in his criminal case, which the District Court 
denied.  
Drabovskiy appeals.  The parties were notified that this case was slated for 
possible summary action.  In response, Drabovskiy asks that we reverse the District 
Court’s ruling and order the District Court to consider the merits of his case.  He also 
presents a “motion for the default and a default judgment,” on the basis that the appellee 
has not filed any argument relating to this appeal, and a “motion for release pending 
appeals.”  
Our review of the District Court’s legal conclusions is plenary, and our 
consideration of its factual findings is under a clearly erroneous standard of review.  See 
Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).  We 
review its exercises of discretion for abuse thereof.  See Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 The District Court properly determined that it was without jurisdiction to 
considered Drabovskiy’s filing as a § 2241 motion.  Drabovskiy cannot bring his claims 
under § 2241, because a motion to challenge his conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 is not “inadequate or ineffective.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255.  However, the 
District Court did not consider whether the filing was a § 2255 motion.  Although 
Drabovskiy asserts that his filing is some sort of habeas petition not covered by §§ 2241, 
2254, or 2255, in substance, his filing is a § 2255 motion.  See Lewis v. Att’y Gen. of the 
U.S., 878 F.2d 714, 722 n.20 (3d Cir. 1989) (requiring that a pro se pleading be “judged 
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by its substance rather than according to its form or label”).  He challenges the whole of 
his criminal case, from the indictment to the jury instructions, claiming trial court error 
and prosecutorial misconduct in between.  Such a § 2255 motion, his first after his direct 
appeal (where it appears no § 2255 motion has been considered on the merits), is 
appropriately entertained only by the court that imposed his sentence.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(a).   
So that the court that imposed Drabovskiy’s sentence may consider his challenge 
to it, we vacate the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 
10.6.  We remand with instructions for the District Court to transfer Drabovskiy’s § 2255 
motion (ECF No. 1) and his proposed amendment (in his motion to amend, ECF No. 7) to 
the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1631 (“[T]he court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal 
to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time 
it was filed.”).  Drabovskiy’s request that we reverse the District Court, his “motion for 
the default and a default judgment,” and his “motion for release pending appeals” are 
denied.   
